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Abstract
We analyse the e¤ects of two di¤erent types of physician remuneration  fee-for-service
and xed salary on the treatment decisions of general practitioners (GPs) and on patients
health outcomes. Using rich Norwegian register data during the period 2009-2013, we focus
on GP locums working in a succession of temporary positions, which allows us to observe the
same GPs working under di¤erent remuneration schemes within a relatively short period of
time. We nd that GPs respond strongly and consistently to changes in remuneration type.
Compared with xed salary, GP payment by fee-for-service leads to an increase in the supply
of consultations and a higher provision of medical services (along several dimensions) per
consultation. This has also signicant implications for patientshealth outcomes. The prob-
ability of experiencing an emergency admission to hospital shortly after a GP consultation is
close to 20 percent lower if the GP is paid by fee-for-service instead of xed salary. Overall,
our analysis suggests that xed-salary remuneration leads to underprovision of primary care.
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1 Introduction
How should provider payment schemes be designed in order to ensure e¢ cient provision of health
care? This is one of the classic questions in health economics and a long-standing policy issue
in most countries. In this paper we address one particular aspect of this question by examining
how the type of remuneration scheme a¤ects the treatment decisions of general practitioners
(GPs) and how this, in turn, a¤ects the total cost of primary care provision and the patients
health outcomes. We make use of extremely rich and high-quality Norwegian register data,
which cover all primary care consultations and all admissions to public somatic hospitals for the
period 2009-2013, in order to compare treatment decisions and patient health outcomes under
two di¤erent remuneration schemes  xed salary and fee-for-service which coexist in the
Norwegian primary care market.1
A key challenge in establishing a causal relationship between remuneration type and GP
behaviour is self-selection of physicians into di¤erent remuneration schemes, since GPsprefer-
ences for remuneration type might be systematically correlated with their treatment decisions.
We deal with this potential problem by focusing on GP locums. These are (mainly) younger
physicians, not yet established as regular GPs, who ll short-term positions that vary with re-
spect to remuneration scheme. We identify 471 GP locums who are exposed to both types of
remuneration (at least once) during the period of analysis. This allows us to estimate models
with physician xed-e¤ects, such that identication of the estimated e¤ects is based on observing
the same physician under di¤erent remuneration schemes.
Our data allows us to estimate the e¤ects of remuneration type on a wide range of variables
related to the GPs treatment decisions: number of consultations, prolonged consultations,
medical procedures, laboratory tests, patient recalls, issuance of sickness certicates and referral
to hospital. In addition, we use the total fee per consultation as a monetary measure of the
total amount of services provided. We also estimate the e¤ect of remuneration type on patients
health outcomes, where the latter are proxied by using information on emergency admissions to
hospital (shortly after a GP consultation).
1Remuneration based on fee-for-service also includes a capitation component that, on average, accounts for
around 30 percent of the GPs income. See Section 4 for a more elaborate description of the institutional details
of the Norwegian primary care market.
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We nd remarkably strong and consistent results. On average, a change in remuneration
scheme from xed salary to fee-for-service leads to a large increase in the supply of consultations
(by more than 26 percent) and to a signicant increase in the total amount of medical services
provided per consultation (by 6.5 percent, as measured by the total fee per consultation). The
increase in the supply of services per consultation is consistent and signicant across all measured
dimensions of service provision. If being paid by fee-for-service instead of xed salary, GPs
provide more prolonged consultations, perform more medical procedures, take more lab tests,
recall patients more often, and are more prone to issue a sickness certicate. However, patients
are less often referred to hospital by fee-for-service GPs. These results are all estimated with a
high degree of precision.
We also explore the importance of GP heterogeneity by creating two sub-samples consisting of
consultations with GP locums who later become regular GPs with xed salary or fee-for-service
contracts, respectively. The underlying assumption is that remuneration type for regular GPs is,
to a much larger extent than for locums, a result of GP choice, where more (less) prot-oriented
GPs self-select into remuneration contracts based on fee-for-service (xed salary). Interestingly,
we nd that our previously described main results are to a large extent driven by the behaviour
of locums who later on establish themselves as regular GPs with fee-for-service contracts. Given
our underlying assumption, this suggests that the e¤ects of remuneration type are larger for more
prot-oriented physicians. This result, and all of our main results described above, conrm a set
of hypotheses derived from a simple theoretical model of physician behaviour which is presented
in Section 3 of the paper.
Finally, we analyse the extent to which the aforementioned e¤ects of remuneration type have
any implications for patientshealth outcomes. It turns out that patients are signicantly, and
surprisingly strongly, a¤ected by the remuneration scheme of the GPs they attend. The prob-
ability of experiencing an emergency admission to hospital within a week of a GP consultation
is almost 19 percent lower if the GP had a fee-for-service contract instead of a xed salary.
Thus, although switching from xed salary to fee-for-service increases the costs of primary care
provision, patients do seem to benet, at least when using emergency admissions to hospitals as
a measure of health outcomes. Based on the estimated value of the additional services provided
by fee-for-service GPs, paying GPs by fee-for-service instead of xed salary implies that the cor-
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responding reduction in emergency admissions to hospital can be obtained at a cost in the range
of NOK 5,900-6,800 per averted emergency admission, depending on the exact denition of our
health outcome variable (emergency admissions within 7 or 14 days after a GP consultation).2
The relatively modest magnitude of these costs, which are considerably lower than the average
cost of emergency hospital admissions during our period of analysis, suggests that xed-salary
remuneration leads to underprovision of primary care services.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present a relatively brief
overview of the relevant literature and explain in detail how our paper contributes to this liter-
ature. We proceed in Section 3 by presenting a simple theoretical model of GP behaviour from
which we derive some testable hypotheses. In Section 4 we explain the relevant institutional
features of the Norwegian primary care market, whereas data and descriptive statistics are pre-
sented in Section 5. Our empirical strategy is explained in Section 6, and our main results are
presented and discussed in Section 7. In Section 8 we test the robustness of these results. The
analysis is then extended in Section 9, where we explore the e¤ects of GP heterogeneity with
respect to prot orientation. Section 10 closes the paper with some concluding remarks.
2 Literature review
There is a huge literature, spanning several decades, providing solid evidence that physicians tend
to respond, in one way or another, to nancial incentives (e.g., Gaynor and Pauly, 1990; Gaynor
and Gertler, 1995; Croxson et al., 2001; Clemens and Gottlieb, 2014; Brekke et al., 2017). A
smaller strand of this literature addresses the potential e¤ects of di¤erent types of remuneration
schemes on physician behaviour. Several studies nd that remuneration schemes based on fee-
for-service tend to stimulate the volume of patient visits in particular. Two relatively well-known
early studies are Hickson et al. (1987) and Krasnik et al. (1990).3 In the former study, the
authors compare fee-for-service with xed salary remuneration in a randomised controlled trial
involving 18 pediatric physicians and nd that the number of patient visits is signicantly higher
under fee-for-service payment. A similar result is found in the latter study, where fee-for-service
2NOK 100  EUR 10  USD 12.
3See also Gosden et al. (2000) for a review of the early literature on the e¤ect of di¤erent remuneration schemes
on physician behaviour.
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is compared with capitation in a controlled before-and-after design with 100 randomly selected
physicians.
The positive e¤ect of fee-for-service payment on the number of patient visits is also corrob-
orated in several later studies. For example, Sørensen and Grytten (2003) compare contracted
(paid by fee-for-service) and salaried primary care physicians in Norway and nd that the former
type of physicians have more visits and other forms of patient contact. Based on Canadian sur-
vey data, Devlin and Sarma (2008) also nd that fee-for-service payment leads to a signicantly
higher number of patient visits, compared with other forms of remuneration. Similar results are
reported by Sarma et al. (2010).
There is also some evidence that fee-for-service payment leads to less referrals to specialists,
compared with other remuneration schemes. This result is found by, e.g., Liddy et al. (2014)
and Sarma et al. (forthcoming), when comparing fee-for-service with capitation using Canadian
data. Our study provides additional evidence that fee-for-service remuneration yields lower
referral rates by GPs, although our basis of comparison is xed-salary remuneration instead of
capitation.4
However, there are also studies that report little or no e¤ect of remuneration type on some
dimensions of physician behaviour. For example, Grytten and Sørensen (2001) nd no di¤erences
between fee-for-service and salaried physicians in how they respond to increased competition.
Based on a eld experiment in the UK, Gosden et al. (2003) nd no signicant di¤erences
between xed salaries and fee-for-service on primary care physician behaviour.
The above referenced literature has a number of di¤erent weaknesses, though. First, it is
notoriously hard to properly control for the e¤ects of self-selection of physicians into di¤erent
remuneration schemes, and the few studies that use an experimental design tend to be based
on very small sample sizes.5 Second, most studies are restricted to one or very few outcome
measures, typically the number of patient visits or similar volume measures. Crucially, objective
measures of patient health outcomes are virtually absent from the literature. It is also worth
noting that previous studies are almost exclusively based on survey data.
4 In the short run, when demand is xed, physician remuneration based on capitation is equivalent to a xed
salary.
5Self-selection of primary care physicians into di¤erent remuneration schemes is documented by Rudoler et al.
(2015), among others.
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The above mentioned limitations of the empirical literature have spurred the recent emer-
gence of an equivalent experimental literature. Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011) and Brosig-Koch
et al. (2016) use lab experiments to compare the e¤ects of fee-for-service versus capitation on
physician behaviour and nd that fee-for-service induces a signicant increase in the supply of
services. However, based on a somewhat di¤erently designed experiment, Green (2014) reports
that fee-for-service leads to both lower quality of services and higher costs of care, compared to
xed salary or capitation. In a similar vein, and based on a medically framed real e¤ort exper-
iment, Lagarde and Blaauw (2017) nd that, whereas fee-for-service payment leads to higher
output than xed salary, the latter remuneration scheme yields higher quality of output. By con-
trast, our empirical results do not provide any evidence that the choice between fee-for-service
and xed salary implies any quantity-quality trade-o¤, as suggested by some of the experimental
literature.
The access to extremely rich register data allows us, in the present paper, to make signicant
contributions to the literature along three di¤erent dimensions. (i) We construct an empirical
strategy that to a large extent eliminates the physician selection problem and therefore allows us
to establish a credible causal relationship between type of remuneration scheme and physician
behaviour. (ii) We measure the e¤ects across a wide variety of outcomes, covering all main
aspects of the physicianstreatment behaviour, which allows us to paint a much more complete
picture of the relationship between remuneration type and physician behaviour. (iii) We measure
the e¤ect of remuneration type on objective proxies of patient health outcomes, which allows
us to draw (at least tentative) conclusions regarding over- or underprovison of primary care
services.
3 Theoretical model
In this section we present a simple theoretical model that captures what we believe to be the key
mechanisms in the relationship between remuneration schemes and GP behaviour in the short
run, when the GPs patient list size is xed. We use this model to derive some predictions 
stated in Proposition 1 at the end of the section that are tested in the empirical analysis.
Consider a GP who has a xed patient list that generates demand for consultations from a
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certain number of patients per period. Each patient is characterised by a severity level s, which
is randomly distributed on the interval [s; s] according to a probability density function f (s).
We assume that s is observable to the GP during a consultation. The health benet from being
treated by the GP is given by b (q; s), where q is the amount of services provided by the GP.
We assume that b is increasing and concave in q. We also assume that there exists a threshold
severity level bs, such that, if s < bs, the GP must treat the patient himself, whereas, if s > bs, the
GP can choose between treating the patient himself or referring the patient to specialist care,
in which case the patient enjoys a health benet eb (s). We assume that eb (s) > b (q; s) for s > bs
and for all q, implying that all patients who are potential candidates for referral would prefer to
be referred to specialist care.6
We assume that the GP has semi-altruistic preferences and maximises a linear combination
of own prots and patient health benet, net of non-monetary costs of consultations and service
provision. These non-monetary costs are given by the increasing and strictly convex e¤ort cost
functions k (n) and c (q), respectively, where n is the number of consultations and q is the amount
of service provision per consultation.
We consider two di¤erent remuneration schemes. If the GP has a fee-for-service contract, he
receives a fee per consultation and also a fee per unit of services o¤ered during a consultation.
Let p > 0 and p > 0 denote the consultation and service fees, respectively, net of monetary
costs.7 We assume that p is such that the maximisation of pq   c (q) has an interior solution
(i.e., q > 0). On the other hand, if the GP has a xed-salary contract, his revenues per period
only consist of a xed wage w per period. Let s  bs be the threshold level of severity above
which the GP refers a patient to specialist care. The GPs expected per-period payo¤ (with n
consultations) is given by
U = (1  )w+
 
p+
Z s
s
(pq   c (q) + b (q; s)) f (s) ds+ 
Z s
s
eb (s) f (s) ds!n k (n) ; (1)
where  is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 (0) if the GP has a fee-for-service (xed-
6Referral to specialist care (e.g., a hospital admission) might in itself imply a disutility for the patient, for
example because of travelling. However, for su¢ ciently high-severity patients (s > bs) we assume that such
disutilities are more than outweighed by the health gains of receiving specialist care.
7Thus, we assume linearity in the monetary costs of consultations and service provision.
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salary) contract, and where  > 0 measures the degree of GP altruism.8
We assume that the GP chooses the number of consultations scheduled per period, n; the
referral threshold rate, s; and the amount of services provided during each consultation, q.
The latter choice is obviously made for each single consultation and depends (in part) on the
patients severity level. From (1) it is straightforward to derive the optimal amount of services
provided to a patient with severity s  s, which is implicitly given by
p  cq (q) + bq (q; s) = 0: (2)
The service level is set such that the GPs marginal benet is equal to the GPs marginal cost of
service provision. It follows straightforwardly from (2) that, for every severity level s, a fee-for-
service GP ( = 1) will optimally choose a higher level of service provision than a xed-salary
GP ( = 0).
Let the solution to (2) be denoted by q (; s). If the optimal referral threshold s is an
interior solution (i.e., if s > bs), it is implicitly given by
pq (; s)  c (q (; s)) + 

b (q (; s) ; s) eb (s) = 0: (3)
Given the optimal service level, the (interior-solution) referral threshold is set such that the
GPs prot from treating the marginal patient (with severity level s) is equal to the patients
health gain of being treated by a specialist instead of the GP, weighted by . However, since
b (q (; s) ; s) < eb (s), (3) never holds if the GP has a xed salary ( = 0). Thus, for every
patient with severity s  bs , a xed-salary GP has no incentive to treat the patient himself and
will optimally set s = bs.
The referral incentives are potentially di¤erent for a fee-for-service GP. If  = 1, an interior
solution exists if pq (; s) > c (q (; s)), which is always true for su¢ ciently low values of .9
Thus, a su¢ ciently prot-oriented fee-for-service GP optimally chooses s > bs and treats some
patients (with s 2 (bs; s)) that would have been better o¤ being treated by a specialist.
8Notice that a fee-for-service contract ( = 1) implies that the GP must cover his monetary costs of con-
sultations and service provision, whereas these costs are covered by the employer under a xed-salary contract
( = 0).
9Given the assumption that the maximisation of pq   c (q) is maximised at a strictly positive value of q, it
follows from (2) that pq (; s) > c (q (; s)) if  is su¢ ciently low.
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Finally, regarding the GPs optimal choice of consultations, n, we assume that this is an
interior solution to the problem where (1) is maximised with respect to n. One interpretation
of this assumption is that that there is excess demand for consultations per period and that
GP availability is rationed by waiting times. An alternative interpretation is that the GP can
induce the desired demand for consultations through patient recalls. Given the optimal referral
threshold, s (), and the optimal service provision, q (; s), the optimal number of consultations
per period is implicitly given by
p+
Z s()
s
(pq (; s)  c (q (; s)) + b (q (; s) ; s)) f (s) ds+
Z s
s()
eb (s) f (s) ds kn (n) = 0:
(4)
It follows from a simple inspection of (4) that a fee-for-service GP ( = 1) will optimally supply
a higher number of consultations per period than a xed-salary GP ( = 0) will do. With the
latter remuneration scheme, the marginal benet for the GP of supplying more consultations is
solely related to increases in patientshealth benets, to which the GP attaches altruistic value.
With fee-for-service remuneration, on the other hand, the GPs marginal benet of supplying
consultations is enhanced by monetary benets (the consultation fee plus service fees, net of
monetary costs), leading to a higher optimal supply of consultations.
It is also easy to verify from (2)-(4) that the magnitude of the di¤erence in the decisions
(q, s, n) between fee-for-service and xed-salary GPs is inversely related to the degree of GP
altruism (). Put di¤erently, a more prot-oriented (less altruistic) GP will respond stronger to
a change in remuneration scheme. We summarise the above analysis as follows:
Proposition 1 For a given patient list size, a GP with a fee-for-service contract will supply
more consultations, o¤er more services per consultation and adopt a (weakly) higher threshold for
specialist referrals than an otherwise similar GP with a xed-salary contract. These di¤erences
are larger for more prot-oriented GPs.
4 Institutional background
In the Norwegian National Health Service, primary care provision is the responsibility of the
municipalities, although funding and regulation are largely made by the central government.
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Since the implementation of the Regular General Practitioner Scheme (Fastlegereformen in
Norwegian) in 2001, each inhabitant of Norway has the right to be listed with a GP and is
free to choose his/her GP (as long as the chosen GP has vacant patient slots). The GP, on the
other hand, cannot choose his/her patients and will be allocated new patients administratively
by the regulator as long as the list is open. About 90% of regular GPs are self-employed
physicians contracting with municipalities, with the remaining GPs being directly employed by
the municipalities. The latter type of contract is relatively more common in rural areas, where
the potential patient population is more limited.
The payment system for self-employed GPs is a combination of a capitation fee (covered by
the municipalities) and fee-for-service (covered partly by the National Health Insurance Scheme
and partly by patient copayment), where the fee-for-service part constitutes, on average, around
70% of the GPs total income. On the other hand, GPs employed by the municipality receive
a xed salary. Irrespective of payment scheme, towards the end of each consultation, GPs
present remuneration claims electronically to the National Health Insurance Administration
(GPs on xed salary claim fee-for-service on behalf of their employer). These claims constitute
an important source of information for our analysis. In order for physicians to qualify for health
insurance reimbursements, two di¤erent requirements must be met: they must be certied as
medical doctors according to EU regulations or document that they are under supervision, and
they must either have a regular GP contract or work as a regular GP locum.10
In this analysis, we study the behaviour of locums in order to investigate GP behaviour in
general (we discuss and justify this strategy in Section 6). There are numerous reasons why
locums are in demand, and locums are used as part of a normal GP work year. According to
an agreement between the physiciansassociation and the municipalitiesassociation, a full-time
regular GP is obliged to receive patients at least 28 hours a week, 44 weeks a year. Regular GPs
are entitled to absence from their practice for specic reasons, such as having holiday, taking
courses, doing research, own illness or childrens illness, pregnancy and childbirth.11 Sometimes
colleagues can step in, but in many cases a locum is needed. Consequently, the use of locums is
10For more information, see https://helsedirektoratet.no/autorisasjon-utdanning-og-godkjenning/autorisasjon-
og-lisens/allmennlege#regelverk.
11This follows from an agreement called ASA 4310 between The Norwegian Association of Local and Regional
Authorities and The Norwegian Medical Association.
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quite widespread; our data shows that during one year (2009) about 30% of all GPs use a locum
at least once.
Besides the provision of primary care, GPs are also entrusted with important gatekeeping
functions regarding referrals to specialist care and certication of sick leave. In Norway, sickness
insurance is mandatory, with sickness coverage of 100% from the rst day of sick leave. A medical
certicate is required for spells of absence of more than three days or eight days, depending on
whether the employer has signed a national agreement aimed at reducing sickness absence.
5 Data and descriptive statistics
5.1 Data sources
In order to analyse how physicians respond to di¤erent remuneration schemes (xed salary or fee-
for-service), we apply Norwegian administrative register data from several sources. These data
can be merged because patients and physicians are both identied by unique personal identiers.
From the National Health Insurance Administration (HELFO), we obtain information about the
fee-for-service payments to GPs from the National Insurance Scheme. For each consultation,
the GP sends (electronically) a claim to the National Health Insurance. The GP species
the medical reason for attendance (based on the International Classication of Primary Care
 ICPC) and procedures performed in the consultation (based on detailed procedure codes).
The invoice also includes the personal identity number of the operating GP and of the patient,
and the date the invoice was sent to HELFO. Since there are specic codes and associated
tari¤s for each service, we observe the medical treatment provided to each patient, including
medical procedures, laboratory tests, prolonged consultations12, etc. We also observe the GPs
total income per visit, as well as patient characteristics, such as age, gender, comorbidity and
diagnosis. Data on the patients education and total income, including labour income, are
available from Statistics Norway.
The database Fastlegedatabasen has information on each GP list on a monthly basis (i.e.,
the GP identier and the GPs list of patients). Thus, for every patient, it is possible to identify
his/her regular GP and GP characteristics such as age, gender, country of birth, and whether
12The exact length of the consultation is not observed, but prolonged consultations are easily identied because
of the specic fee claimed.
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the GP is a specialist. Finally, the Norwegian Patient Register contains information on referrals
and admissions to secondary care in Norway, including the day of referral and day of hospital
admission, as well as type of admission (elective or emergency).
5.2 Identication of GP locums and their remuneration schemes
The National Health Insurance data inform us  for each consultation - who is the operating
GP and how this GP is remunerated, but they do not identify locums directly. To identify
whether the GP is a locum, we impose the following exclusion criteria: (i) the GP identier of
the consultation cannot correspond to that of the patients own regular GP or any other regular
GP registered in the Fastlegedatabasen in that particular month, and (ii) the GP registered for
the consultation should not be an intern. We want to exclude all consultations with interns since
internships are categorised by xed salary only. By applying these exclusion criteria, we isolate
the subsample of consultations held by locums. We then dene characteristics of the practice
(i.e., the regular GP of the treated patient), such as list length, by linking the treated patient
with the patient list information.
Our explanatory variable of interest is the locums remuneration scheme, which may vary
over time since it mirrors the remuneration scheme of the regular GP practice that the locum
works in.
5.3 Outcome variables
We investigate several dimensions of GPsservice provision: total fee per consultation, whether
the patient visits the same GP practice within 14 days (recalls), whether the patient is referred to
hospital for a planned admission, as well as number of consultations per day. We also investigate
specic components of GPsservice provision during a consultation: whether the consultation
is prolonged or not, whether a test is taken, the number of medical procedures, and whether the
GP issues a sickness certicate. Furthermore, we dene two di¤erent measures of patient health
outcomes: emergency admission to a primary care emergency centre and emergency admission
to a somatic hospital. These health indicators relate to the period shortly after the GP visit (1-7
or 1-14 days), and they are generated by merging data from the HELFO and the Norwegian
Patient Register by means of the patient personal identier. All other outcome variables (apart
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from referrals) are generated from the HELFO data.13
Our data sources cover all GP consultations and all admissions to public somatic hospitals
for the years 2009-2013. We include all consultations where the patient is above 20 years of age.
This leaves us with a data set of 5,134,780 observations (consultations), involving 4,438 locums.
In Table 1 below, these GPs are grouped in three categories according to their remuneration
scheme. Some locums have received only fee-for-service payment or only a xed salary in all
consultations in our data set, and the mean values for these two categories are shown in Columns
1 and 2, respectively. For those locums who have experienced both remuneration schemes,
Columns 3 and 4 show average values by payment scheme.
[ Table 1 ]
As is evident by the rst column of Table 1, the majority of GPs who have practiced as
locums at some point during the observational period, have worked in practices with fee-for-
service payment only (3,139 out of 4,438 locums), while 828 locums have been on xed salary
only (Column 2). This is to be expected, since fee-for-service is by far the most common type
of remuneration in the Norwegian regular GP scheme. There is, however, a substantial number
of locums who have experienced both payment schemes (471 GP locums).
Whether we compare Column 1 with Column 2 or Column 3 with Column 4, the same
picture emerges. When paid by fee-for-service, locum GPs hold more consultations and o¤er
more services per consultation than when paid with xed salary, as shown by the higher average
total fee per consultation. A patient recall is also more likely when the locum GP is paid fee-for-
service. On the other hand, the frequency of planned hospital admissions is lower. A closer look
at locum GPsservice provision during a consultation reveals that, along all dimensions studied,
fee-for-service locums o¤er more services. They have a larger share of prolonged consultations,
take more tests and perform more medical procedures. They also issue sickness certicates more
often.
The patient population also di¤ers according to remuneration schemes. Patients in fee-for-
service consultations are on average 2.5-3 years younger and the proportion of women as well
as the average level of education and income are higher than for patients visiting locums on
13The variable referrals for planned admissions is generated by comparing the date of consultation in the HELFO
data with the date of referral in the Norwegian Patient Register.
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xed salary. This could reect a rural/urban di¤erence. On the other hand, the proportion of
patients with comorbidity is also higher, on average, in consultations with fee-for-service locums.
Descriptive statistics show that locums are quite similar across remuneration categories; about
half of them are men and the average age is about 36 years, only 3-5 percent are medical
specialists, which indicates that many of them are early in their career. We note that practices
remunerated with fee-for-service are characterised by longer patient lists, which again probably
reects an urban/rural di¤erence. In the empirical analysis, we will control for a wide range of
patient and GP characteristics, and in our robustness analysis (Section 8) we will address the
question of geographical location of practices.
6 Empirical strategy
The main challenge involved in identifying the causal e¤ect of di¤erent remuneration schemes on
GP behaviour is to account for a potential selection bias related to the fact that the matching
of GPs to remuneration schemes might be partly a result of GP choice. If GPs can choose
between xed-salary contracts and fee-for-service contracts, and if these choices are systemati-
cally related to di¤erences in GP practice styles, which in turn might be related to di¤erences
in GP preferences (e.g., the GPs degree of prot orientation), the observed di¤erences in GP
behaviour across di¤erent remuneration schemes would to some extent capture di¤erences in
GP preferences rather than di¤erences in remuneration schemes, which would lead to biased
estimates.
Our empirical strategy to tackle this potential selection problem is two-fold. First, we restrict
our sample to consultations involving only GP locums. As described in the previous section, this
subset of GPs consists of relatively young physicians, many of whom have not yet established
their own practice. These are GPs who spend a period taking up available vacancies until they
are able to enter the market as regular GPs. Thus, for this subset of GPs, it is reasonable to
assume that the matching of GPs to remuneration schemes depends largely on the availability of
temporary vacancies and is therefore, to a considerable extent, random. The fact that these are
mostly short-term vacancies gives additional credibility to the assumption of random matching.14
14More than half of the vacancies in our sample are 5 weeks or less in duration, and more than 90 percent
are less than a year. See Figures A1-A3 in the Appendix for an illustration of how the temporary positions are
14
Second, the quality of our data allows us to identify GPs who face di¤erent remuneration schemes
xed salary and fee-for-service over time. Thus, we are able to estimate models with GP xed
e¤ects, where identication is based on observing the same GP under both types of remuneration
schemes.
For the category of locums that have worked under both remuneration schemes, we have also
checked that there is no systematic relationship between the sequence of vacancies and the type
of remuneration. Thus, we nd no pattern where locums tend to rst work in a xed-salary
practice and then in a fee-for-service practice, or vice versa.15 For the subset of GP locums who
were observed in only two temporary positions (with di¤erent remuneration schemes), 59.8%
had a xed salary in the rst position, which is reasonably close to what we would expect if
remuneration schemes were randomly assigned to GPs.16 This is reassuring for the internal
validity of our empirical strategy.
Finally, it is also worth emphasising that not only is the use of locums widespread, as
discussed in Section 5, but it is also very common for GPs to work as locums at some point
(usually at the beginning) of their careers. Our data shows that, out of the 1,131 physicians
who became regular GPs during the latter half of our period of analysis, 2010-2013, almost 80
percent of them (882 physicians) had worked as locums (during 2007-2013) before they became
regular GPs. This suggests that the sample of consultations used in our analysis involves a set
of GPs that are highly representative (apart from age) of the entire population of GPs in the
Norwegian primary care market, which is reassuring for the external validity of our empirical
strategy.
We estimate the following empirical model,
yijt = 0 + 1  FFS + 2  lit + 3 Xijt + i + j + !t + "ijt; (5)
where yijt measures the treatment decision (according to each of the variable denitions described
in Section 5) of GP i in a consultation involving a patient with main diagnosis j at time t; FFS
distributed according to their durations.
15Among the GP locums working under both remuneration schemes during a succession of temporary positions,
51.6% (48.4%) were paid by xed salary (fee-for-service) in the rst of these positions.
16Among the GP locums working under both remuneration schemes, 92 physicians are observed in only two
di¤erent positions.
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is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 (0) if the GP is paid by fee-for-service (xed
salary); lit is the list length of GP i at time t; Xijt is a vector of patient characteristics, such as
age, education, income and an indicator for having any comorbidity; i is a GP-xed e¤ect; j is
a diagnosis-xed e¤ect; !t is a time-xed e¤ect (year and month); and "ijt is an error term. Our
parameter of interest is 1, which measures the e¤ect of changing the GP remuneration scheme
from xed salary to fee-for-service. Importantly, the inclusion of a GP-xed e¤ect implies that
we are able to control for all time-invariant (observable and unobservable) GP characteristics,
including the degree of altruism or prot-orientation, which is likely to a¤ect the GPs response
to di¤erent remuneration schemes. In all our estimations, standard errors are clustered at GP
level.
7 Results and discussion
Our main results are presented in this section. First we present the e¤ects of GP remuneration
type on a wide range of variables that characterise di¤erent dimensions of the GPs treatment
decisions. Subsequently, we report the e¤ects of di¤erent remuneration schemes on two di¤erent
measures of health outcomes and discuss potential implications for welfare and public policy.
7.1 Remuneration schemes and treatment decisions
The e¤ects of the type of remuneration scheme on GP behaviour are presented in Table 2. In the
rst column we report the e¤ect on the total fee per consultation, which is a monetary measure
of the total amount of services o¤ered by the GP during a consultation (i.e., the variable q in
our theory model). The estimated coe¢ cient indicates that a change in remuneration scheme
from xed salary to fee-for-service leads to a signicant increase in the total amount of services
provided per consultation. This result is in line with our theoretical prediction. The e¤ect is also
economically signicant, with a magnitude that corresponds to a percentage increase of around
6.5.
[ Table 2 here ]
In the second and third columns we report estimates along two other dimensions of GP
behaviour, namely the frequency of patient recalls (within 14 days) and hospital referrals. The
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type of remuneration scheme is shown to have a highly signicant e¤ect along both dimensions.
All else equal, a signicantly lower share of consultations will result in a referral to hospital care
if the GP is paid by fee-for-service instead of a xed salary, which is in line with our theoretical
predictions. The e¤ect is also sizeable and corresponds to a reduction in the frequency of
hospital admissions by more than 15 percent. Fee-for-service GPs also recall patients with a
higher frequency than do xed-salary GPs, with an estimated di¤erence of almost 9 percent.
This can partly (though far from fully) explain the result reported in the nal column of Table
2, that a change from xed-salary to fee-for-service remuneration leads to a signicant and large
increase (by more than 26 percent) in the supply of consultations per day. Thus, fee-for-service
remuneration does not only lead to higher service provision per consultation, but it also leads
to a higher supply of consultations, which again conrms our theoretical predictions.
For the remaining independent variables that are intuitively related to GP behaviour, the
estimated coe¢ cients have the expected sign. In particular, older and sicker (measured by
comorbidity) patients tend to consume a higher level of GP services and be subject to recall and
hospital referral on a more frequent basis.
The signicantly positive e¤ect of fee-for-service payment on the total fee per consultation, as
reported in Table 2, suggests that fee-for-service GPs on average o¤er more services to patients
during a consultation. We explore the sources of this e¤ect by estimating the e¤ect of fee-for-
service payment on four variables that measure di¤erent types of services o¤ered by the GP: (1)
the share of consultations that are prolonged beyond 20 minutes, (2) the share of consultations
in which at least one lab test is taken, (3) the number of medical procedures per consultation,
and (4) the share of consultations in which a sickness certicate is issued.
[ Table 3 here ]
The estimated results reported in Table 3 show that fee-for-service payment has a sta-
tistically signicant and positive e¤ect on all four variables. Notice also that the magnitudes of
these e¤ects are all relatively sizeable. All else equal, if the payment scheme of a GP changes
from xed salary to fee-for-service, the GP will, on average, increase the share of prolonged
consultations by 12 percent, increase the frequency of testing by 7 percent, increase the number
of medical procedures by 23 percent, and increase the propensity to issue sickness certicates
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by 9 percent.
Summing up, we nd that a change in payment scheme from xed salary to fee-for-service
leads to a relatively large increase in the GPs service provision during a consultation, and
this increase applies to all dimensions measured, as evidenced by the results shown in Table
3. Furthermore, such a change in payment scheme also reduces the GPs propensity to refer
patients to hospital care and leads to a higher supply of consultations. All the above mentioned
e¤ects are estimated with a high degree of precision, and these results are consistent with the
predictions from our theory model, as summarised by Proposition 1 in Section 3.
7.2 Remuneration schemes and health outcomes
The increase in GP service provision due to fee-for-service payment implies, all else equal, a
higher cost of primary care provision for the public payer. In fact, the coe¢ cient reported in
the rst column of Table 2 gives a precise estimate of the extra cost per consultation that can
be attributed to the change in GP behaviour caused by a change in payment scheme.
However, from a welfare or policy perspective, the additional costs of a fee-for-service pay-
ment scheme must be weighed against the potential benets of a higher level of primary care
provision. Does the increase in GP service provision improve patientshealth outcomes, or does
a fee-for-service system contribute to overprovisionof primary care services with little or no
health benets? In order to take some steps towards answering this question, we estimate the
e¤ects of fee-for-service payment on two di¤erent measures of health outcomes, namely the rate
of emergency admission (within 7 or 14 days of a GP consultation) to primary care emergency
centres or to (somatic) hospitals.
[ Table 4 here ]
The results, reported in Table 4, show that patients who have attended a fee-for-service
GP have a signicantly lower probability of experiencing an emergency admission to hospital
shortly after the GP consultation. These e¤ects are also quite large in magnitude. For example,
the probability of experiencing an emergency admission to hospital within a week of a GP
consultation is almost 19 percent lower if the GP is paid by fee-for-service instead of a xed
salary. The estimated coe¢ cients for admission to primary care emergency centres are also
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negative, though not statistically signicant.
7.3 Welfare and policy implications
Our results suggest that the number of emergency admissions to hospital can be reduced by
changing GP remuneration from xed salary to fee-for-service. But at which costs? Considering
emergency admissions within 7 days, the value of our estimated coe¢ cient (Table 4) implies that
one emergency admission is averted for every 370 GP consultations, on average, if the GP is
paid by fee-for-service instead of xed salary. Since the estimated value of the additional services
provided per consultation by a fee-for-service GP is NOK 18.44 (Table 2), this implies that, by
a change of remuneration scheme from xed salary to fee-for-service, emergency admissions to
hospital can be reduced at a cost of around NOK 6,800 per averted emergency admission. This
cost estimate reduces to around NOK 5,900 if we consider emergency admissions within 14
days. By comparison, the average cost of emergency hospital admissions during 2009-2013 can
be estimated at around NOK 23,000.17 Even if we only consider the extra payment from the
public payer triggered by each emergency hospital admission, which was around NOK 9,200,
on average, during 2009-2013, these costs are substantially higher than our estimated costs of
reducing emergency hospital admissions through a change in GP remuneration from xed salary
to fee-for-service.18
Our dependent variables in this part of the analysis are of course imperfect measures of health
outcomes, and the results should therefore be interpreted with some care. Nevertheless, our
results give some indications that the higher supply of primary care services induced by fee-for-
service contracts leads to improved health outcomes, and that emergency admissions to hospital
can be reduced at a relatively low cost through changes in GP remuneration. Furthermore,
we have shown that GP remuneration based on fee-for-service yields fewer hospital referrals,
thus implying a further reduction in the cost of secondary care provision. Overall, we believe
that our analysis provides suggestive evidence that GP remuneration based on xed salaries
leads to underprovision of primary care services and higher total health care costs, relative to
17During 2009-2013, the average DRG price was around NOK 37,100. With an average DRG weight for
emergency hospital admissions of 0.62 during the same period, this implies an average cost of around NOK
23,000.
18 In Norway, secondary care is nanced by a combination of DRG pricing and block grants, with a DRG share
of 40% during 2009-2013.
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fee-for-service remuneration.
However, we must stress that there are several caveats to this tentative welfare analysis.
Potential health gains from changes in GP remuneration might also be inuenced by general
equilibrium e¤ects in the primary care market. For example, a large-scale change of GP remu-
neration schemes might lead to exit and entry of physicians, which, in case of GP heterogeneity,
might change the distribution of GP typesin the market, with corresponding changes in ser-
vice provision.19 Furthermore, from a policy perspective, costs and benets in the health care
sector should not be evaluated in isolation, but should be seen in conjunction with costs and
benets in other sectors that are indirectly a¤ected by changes in GP behaviour. For example,
we have shown that fee-for-service payments lead to a higher frequency of sick-listing, which
implies that this payment scheme imposes a higher cost on the sickness benet system and leads
to a productivity loss in the labour market. A full-edged welfare analysis, which is beyond the
scope of this paper, would need to take all these direct and indirect e¤ects into account.
8 Robustness
Our identication strategy relies on the implicit assumption that the characteristics of the patient
population of a GP is unrelated to the GPs remuneration scheme. However, even if we control
for a wide range of patient characteristics, such as age, gender, income, education, diagnosis and
comorbidity, we cannot a priori rule out the possibility that there might exist some systematic
di¤erences between the patients of xed-salary GPs and fee-for-service GPs that we are not fully
able to control for in our empirical model, potentially leading to biased estimates. In this section
we test this hypothesis by conducting two di¤erent robustness checks.
First, we construct a sample consisting of consultations at local (municipal) primary care
emergency centres, involving the same patients that we observe in our main sample (consisting
of consultations with GP locums). More specically, we construct this sample such that all
consultations (at emergency centres) involve patients who, in our main sample, are observed
in consultations only with fee-for-service GPs or only with xed-salary GPs. Naturally, this
sample includes all GPs who have treated patients at emergency care centres, therefore a much
19We explore the issue of GP heterogeneity in Section 9.
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larger GP population than in the main analysis. Attending a primary care emergency centre
is an alternative way for patients to access primary care in Norway and is typically used if the
patients regular GP (or a substitute GP) is not available. At primary care emergency centres,
physicians are paid according to the same fee-for-service schedule as regular GPs and, more
importantly, the matching between physicians and patients is random.
This allows us to construct the following placebo test. By dening an indicator variable that
takes the value 1 (0) if the consultation involves a patient who is observed only in consulta-
tions with fee-for-service (xed-salary) GPs in the main sample, we can test whether these two
categories of patients are treated di¤erently, on average, in consultations at primary care emer-
gency centres. Since the matching between patients and GPs at emergency centres is random,
any such di¤erences should only reect di¤erences in average severity between the two patient
groups. Thus, if the results reported in the previous section are purely caused by di¤erences in
GP remuneration schemes, we should not expect to nd any systematic di¤erences in how the
two groups of patients are treated at primary care emergency centres.
[ Table 5 here ]
We estimate models with and without municipality-xed e¤ects (in addition to GP-xed
e¤ects), and the results are reported in Table 5. Since we include GP xed e¤ects, the e¤ects
are identied by GPs who at primary care emergency centres treat both patient categories. These
results reveal that there are practically no di¤erences in the way these two categories of patients
are treated in emergency centre consultations. There are statistically signicant di¤erences
along some of the dimensions of service provision, but they are inconsistently signed and, more
importantly, these di¤erences are all of negligible magnitude. When we include municipality-
xed e¤ects (Panel B in Table 5), the only statistically signicant di¤erences are found in the
frequency of testing and in the total fee per consultation (which is weakly signicant), but
the magnitudes of these di¤erences are very close to zero. We take these results as reassuring
conrmation that the estimates from our main model do not seem to reect systematic di¤erences
between the patient populations of fee-for-service and xed-salary GPs.
Our second robustness check addresses a potential concern related to an unequal geographical
distribution of the two types of remuneration schemes. Since xed-salary GP practices are more
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prevalent in rural than in urban areas, our results might be a¤ected by the potential existence of
systematic di¤erences between rural and urban GP practices, such as di¤erences in the degree
of local competition and in the composition of the patient population (as indicated in Section
5), that might a¤ect GP behaviour.
We deal with this potential concern by restricting the main analysis sample to consultations
involving only GPs who have worked as locums more than once in the same municipality. Using
this restricted sample, we re-estimate the e¤ects of remuneration type in a model where we
include both GP and municipality xed e¤ects. This implies that identication is based on
GPs who are observed under both types of remuneration schemes in the same municipality
(our sample contains 290 GPs of this kind). This approach should also eliminate any potential
concern about physician selection based on the geographical location of vacancies.
[ Tables 6 and 7 here ]
The results from this robustness check are reported in Tables 6-8. Reassuringly, the estimated
e¤ects of remuneration type on GP behaviour (displayed in Tables 6 and 7) are very similar, in
terms of both precision and magnitude, to the ones we obtain when using the main sample, as
reported in Tables 2 and 3. The only notable di¤erence is the e¤ect of fee-for-service payment
on hospital referral rates, which is statistically insignicant (though the point estimate is still
negative).
[ Table 8 ]
In Table 8 we show the e¤ects of remuneration type on patient health outcomes. Interestingly,
these e¤ects are even larger (and also more precisely estimated) than those obtained from the
main sample (shown in Table 4). Using the restricted sample, the probability of experiencing
an emergency hospital admission within a week of a GP consultation is now 25 percent lower if
the GP is paid by fee-for-service instead of xed salary. Furthermore, the e¤ect of fee-for-service
remuneration on the rate of emergency admissions to primary care emergency centres is also
negative and (weakly) statistically signicant.
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9 Extension: Prot orientation and GP self-selection
In this section we extend our empirical analysis by exploring potential di¤erences between GP
types, and the importance of GP selection into di¤erent types of remuneration schemes, by linking
GPsbehaviour as locums to their remuneration scheme when they later on enter the market as
regular GPs. GPs are likely to di¤er along several dimensions that are not directly observable,
including their degree of altruism or prot-orientation, as measured by the parameter  in our
theory model. In Section 3 we show that the e¤ects of di¤erent remuneration schemes on GP
behaviour are smaller the less prot-oriented the GPs are. In our main analysis, we control
for GP heterogeneity by estimating models with GP-xed e¤ects, and our estimated e¤ects of
di¤erent remuneration schemes capture the average response of a group of GPs that presumably
di¤er in their degree of prot orientation.
In order to explore the possibility of heterogeneous e¤ects along this particular dimension,
we exploit the fact that our data allows us to observe some of the GP locums (in the main
sample) after they have entered the market as regular GPs, either with a fee-for-service contract
or with a xed-salary contract. While we have argued that the matching between GP and type
of remuneration scheme in short-term vacancies is to a large extent random, it seems entirely
reasonable to assume that the type of remuneration scheme a GP is exposed to in a regular
practice is, to a much larger extent, a result of the GPs own choice. Being a self-employed GP
with fee-for-service payment is potentially much more protable, but also entails much more
risk, than being employed on a xed-salary contract. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that
more prot-oriented GPs seek to enter the market in fee-for-service practices, whereas less prot-
oriented GPs tend to select themselves into xed-salary practices. If this assumption holds, we
can explore how the e¤ects of di¤erent remuneration schemes depend on the GPs degree of
prot-orientation by creating two subsamples each consisting of consultations with GP locums
who later become regular GPs with, respectively, fee-for-service payment and xed salary and
re-estimate (5) for each of the two subsamples.20
[ Table 9 ]
20Notice that the length of the panel allows us to observe only a subset of the GP locums after they have
entered the market as regular GPs. Thus, the sum of the two subsamples is considerably smaller than the sample
used in the main analysis.
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The results are presented in Tables 9 and 10 (which are equivalent to Tables 2 and 3 in
Section 7). According to our underlying assumptions, the estimated e¤ects of fee-for-service
versus xed-salary remuneration for relatively prot-oriented GPs are shown in Panel A, whereas
the equivalent e¤ects for less prot-oriented (more altruistic) GPs are shown in Panel B.
Considering rst Table 9, the di¤erence in the estimates between Panel A and Panel B is
quite striking. Regarding the total amount of services o¤ered per consultation (as measured
by the total fee), a change in remuneration scheme from xed salary to fee-for-service yields
a signicant and strong response from prot-oriented GPs (Panel A), whereas the response
from more altruistic GPs (Panel B) is not signicantly di¤erent from zero. The former type of
GPs also respond stronger with respect to their hospital referral practice and their supply of
consultations.
[ Table 10 ]
The same pattern appears when we consider the di¤erent dimensions of GP service provision.
The response of prot-oriented GPs to fee-for-service payment is signicant and strong along all
four dimensions (Panel A). On the other hand, the response from more altruistic GPs is weaker
(apart from sick-listing) and statistically insignicant along two of the four dimensions measured
(Panel B).
In sum, these results are consistent with our theoretical predictions that the e¤ects of di¤erent
remuneration schemes are stronger for more prot-oriented GPs, and therefore add credibility to
our underlying assumption that more prot-oriented GPs are more likely to select themselves into
GP practices with fee-for-service payments. As such, these results also underline the importance
of our identication strategy in order to overcome this selection problem.
10 Concluding remarks
In this paper we analyse the e¤ects of two di¤erent types of physician remuneration  fee-for-
service and xed salary  on physicians treatment decisions and patients health outcomes.
Using extremely rich Norwegian register data, covering the period 2009-2013, we estimate the
e¤ects of remuneration type on a wide range of outcome variables, including objective measures
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of health outcomes. We identify these e¤ects empirically by comparing the treatment behaviour
of the same physicians (GP locums) working under di¤erent payment schemes in di¤erent short-
term vacancies within a relatively short period of time, which is our strategy to overcome the
problem of self-selection of physicians into di¤erent remuneration schemes.
We nd strong and consistent results. All else equal, if a GP is paid by fee-for-service
instead of a xed salary, the GP supplies a higher number of consultations, o¤ers more prolonged
consultations, performs more medical procedures and takes more tests per consultation, recalls
patients more often, issues more often sickness certicates, but refers patients less often to
specialist care (hospitals). All these results conrm a set of hypotheses that we derive from a
simple theoretical model of physician behaviour under xed demand. This model also predicts
that the aforementioned e¤ects are stronger for more prot-oriented physicians, which we conrm
in our empirical analysis by using type of contract (fee-for-service or xed salary) as regular GP
as a proxy for the degree of prot-orientation.
The type of GP remuneration is also found to have signicant and strong e¤ects on patients
health outcomes, as measured by the probability of emergency admissions to hospital shortly af-
ter a GP consultation. All else equal, this probability is almost 20 percent lower if the GP is paid
by fee-for-service instead of xed salary. When seen in conjunction, our estimates suggest that,
by making GP payment based on fee-for-service instead of xed salary, emergency admissions
to hospitals can be reduced at a cost in the range of NOK 5,900-6,800 per averted emergency
admission. This indicates that xed-salary payment of physicians leads to underprovision of
primary care services.
Finally, we would like to point out that physician payment schemes might have additional
long-run e¤ects on physician behaviour that are not fully accounted for in our analysis. Since the
GP locums mainly ll relatively short-term vacancies (cf. Figures A1-A3 in the Appendix), their
decision making is presumably taking place in the context of xed demand. Thus, our choice of
empirical strategy implies that we are measuring mainly short-run e¤ects of remuneration type
on physician behaviour. In the longer run, it is reasonable to assume that GPs can, to some
extent, a¤ect demand through their treatment decisions. More specically, it seems reasonable
to assume that demand depends positively on the amount of services provided by the GP. If
so, this implies that the di¤erence in GPsincentives for service provision under fee-for-service
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and xed salary, respectively, is larger in the long run than in the short run (given that the
marginal patient is protablefor the GP). In other words, a GP that is paid by fee-for-service
might provide a higher amount of services not only to generate more revenues from a xed list
of patients, but also to attract more patients to his list.21 Thus, our estimates of the e¤ects of
remuneration type on GPsservice provision could arguably be seen as lower bound estimates
of the long run e¤ects.
Appendix
In Figures A1-A3 we show the distribution of temporary GP positions according to their duration
(in weeks). Figure A1 shows this distribution for all positions, whereas Figures A2 and A3 show
the distributions for positions with fee-for-service and xed-salary contracts, respectively. Notice
that, for presentational purposes, the gures only include temporary positions up to 104 weeks
duration. Out of 11,177 positions (9,105 with fee-for-service contracts and 2,072 with xed-salary
contracts), 177 positions (164 with fee-for-service and 13 with xed salary) have a duration of
more than 104 weeks.
[ Figures A1-A3 here ]
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics, by the GP locum’s remuneration scheme  
 Fee-for-
service only 
Fixed salary 
only 
Both fee-for-service and  
fixed salary 
   Fee-for-
service 
Fixed salary 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variables     
     
Total fee per consultation 286.0 (154.5) 253.4 (147.1) 286.8 (155.7) 263.1 (146.8) 
Recall within 14 days 0.180 0.160 0.183 0.164 
Referral to hospital, planned admission 0.052 0.066 0.054 0.067 
Number of consultations per day
1
 12.6 (5.2) 7.0 (3.8) 12.0 (4.9) 7.6 (4.1) 
Prolonged consultation 0.355 0.309 0.373 0.334 
Laboratory test 0.422 0.374 0.401 0.360 
Number procedures 0.192 (0.466) 0.095 (0.344) 0.178 (0.461) 0.113 (0.369) 
Sick note issued
2
 0.192 0.133 0.188 0.147 
Emergency adm. 1-7 days, PCEC
3
  0.010 0.009 0.010 0.010 
Emergency adm. 1-14 days, PCEC  0.015 0.014 0.016 0.015 
Emergency adm. 1-7 days, hospital 0.014 0.016 0.014 0.017 
Emergency adm. 1-14 days, hospital
4
 0.024 0.026 0.024 0.027 
Patient characteristics     
Age 50.9 (18.9) 53.6 (19.8) 51.3 (18.9) 54.3 (19.2) 
Male 0.384 0.412 0.392 0.429 
Comorbidity 0.150 0.112 0.162 0.110 
Total income/10,000 NOK
 
35.5 (27.5) 32.4 (22.7) 35.3 (26.7) 33.5 (60.5) 
Low education 0.316 0.353 0.336 0.373 
Medium education 0.424 0.441 0.425 0.448 
High education 0.260 0.206 0.239 0.179 
Locum GP characteristics     
Male 0.492 0.501      0.546 
Age 36.0 (8.6) 35.9 (10.4)      37.0 (9.6) 
Norwegian 0.691 0.700      0.628 
Specialist 0.053 0.033      0.037 
Practice characteristics     
List length/100 12.33 (3.53) 9.12 (3.41) 11.50 (3.44) 9.43 (3.21) 
     
Observations 4,203,027 231,875 572,263 127,615 
Patients 1,251,826 111,357 243,813 73,113 
GPs 3,139 828        471 
1
 Means per day of practice.
 2
 Means for the employed part of the patient list population. 
3 
Emergency admission 
at primary care emergency centre (PCEC) within 7 days after GP consultation. 
4 
Emergency admission at 
somatic hospital within 14 days after GP consultation. 
Note: Means are taken across consultations for patients aged 20 and above.  
  
Table 2. Effects of remuneration schemes on GP behaviour. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total fee per 
consultation 
Recall within  
14 days 
Referral to 
hospital 
(planned) 
Number of 
consultations 
per day 
Practice characteristics     
Fee-for-service 18.4412
***
 0.0154
***
 -0.0083
***
 3.1264
***
 
 (33.56) (10.53) (-9.76) (67.91) 
     
List length -0.7265
***
 0.0016
***
 -0.0002
** 
0.2752
*** 
 (-19.54) (15.98) (-2.96) (73.87) 
Patient characteristics     
Patient male -0.7489
***
 -0.0062
***
 0.0022
***
 - 
 (-5.33) (-16.47) (10.13)  
     
Patient age 0.2694
***
 0.0006
***
 0.0002
***
 - 
 (66.24) (55.72) (26.85)  
     
Low education 2.7391
***
 0.0258
***
 -0.0027
***
 - 
 (15.38) (54.24) (-9.70)  
     
Medium education -1.5126
***
 0.0123
***
 -0.0006
*
 - 
 (-9.24) (28.19) (-2.52)  
     
Income -0.0460
***
 -0.0002
***
 0.00002
***
 - 
 (-19.76) (-27.51) (6.23)  
     
Comorbidity 48.5234
**
 0.0036
***
 0.0163
***
 - 
 (259.25) (7.24) (56.03)  
     
Mean y 284.048 0.179 0.0532 11.872 
Fixed effects:     
GP Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnosis Yes Yes Yes - 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GPs 4,438 4,438 4,438 4438 
Observations 5,134,780 5,134,780 5,134,780 432,513 
t statistics in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
  
Table 3. Effects of remuneration schemes on service provision during a GP consultation. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Prolonged 
consultation 
Lab test Procedures Sickness 
certificate 
Practice characteristics 
Fee-for-service 0.0429
***
 0.0291
***
 0.0420
***
 0.0235
***
 
 (24.87) (17.18) (26.81) (12.30) 
     
List length -0.0043
***
 -0.0001 -0.0002
* 
0.0005
***
 
 (-36.74) (-0.50) (-2.30) (3.70) 
Patient characteristics 
Patient male -0.0146
***
 -0.0081
***
 0.0009
*
 -0.0120
***
 
 (-33.00) (-18.84) (2.33) (-24.43) 
     
Patient age 0.0014
***
 0.0016
***
 -0.0001
***
 -0.0021
***
 
 (111.91) (124.35) (-7.69) (-121.29) 
     
Low education -0.0285
***
 -0.0030
***
 0.0054
***
 0.0431
***
 
 (-50.90) (-5.45) (10.62) (70.99) 
     
Medium education -0.0177
***
 -0.0027
***
 0.0020
***
 0.0272
***
 
 (-34.45) (-5.29) (4.23) (51.97) 
     
Income 0.0001
***
 -0.0001
*** 
-0.0001
***
 0.0002
***
 
 (13.36) (-11.31) (-11.10) (30.59) 
     
Comorbidity 0.1197
***
 0.0605
***
 0.0633
***
 0.0700
***
 
 (203.52) (105.07) (118.53) (106.93) 
     
Mean y 0.354 0.416 0.184 0.275 
Fixed effects:     
GP Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnosis Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GPs 4,438 4,438 4,438 4,438 
Observations 5,134,780 5,134,780 5,134,780 3,418,090 
t statistics in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
  
Table 4. Effects of remuneration schemes on health outcomes. 
 Primary care emergency centres     Somatic hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Emergency 
admission within 
7 days 
Emergency 
admission within 
14 days 
Emergency 
admission within 
7 days 
Emergency 
admission within 
14 days 
Practice characteristics    
Fee-for-service -0.0005
 
-0.0005
 
-0.0027
***
 -0.0031
***
 
 (-1.34) (-1.12) (-5.97) (-5.27) 
     
List length -0.0000
 
-0.0000
 
-0.0000 0.0000 
 (-1.36) (-0.80) (-0.36) (0.54) 
Patient characteristics    
Male -0.0009
*** 
-0.0015
*** 
0.0015
*** 
0.0020
*** 
 (-8.82) (-12.44) (12.37) (13.15) 
     
Age -0.00003
*** 
-0.0001
*** 
0.0002
*** 
0.0002
*** 
 (-10.62) (-15.70) (43.73) (57.27) 
     
Low education 0.0034
*** 
0.0054
*** 
0.0027
*** 
0.0047
*** 
 (27.31) (35.01) (17.61) (24.71) 
     
Medium education 0.0011
*** 
0.0018
*** 
0.0005
*** 
0.0010
*** 
 (9.27) (12.68) (3.80) (5.97) 
     
Income -0.00002
*** 
-0.00003
*** 
-0.00003
*** 
-0.00005
*** 
 (-13.11) (-17.03) (-14.62) (-20.93) 
     
Comorbidity 0.0002
 
0.0005
** 
-0.0000 0.0002
 
 (1.28) (2.90) (-0.13) (0.87) 
     
Mean y 0.0097 0.0154 0.0145 0.0238 
Fixed effects:     
GP Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnosis Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GPs 4,438 4,438 4,438 4,438 
Observations 5,134,780 5,134,780 5,134,780 5,134,780 
t statistics in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
  
Table 5. Placebo test: Consultations
1
 at primary care emergency centres. Service provision 
estimated without/with municipality-fixed effects. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Prolonged 
consultation  
Lab test Procedure Sickness 
certificate 
Total fee Admitted to 
hospital 
(emergency) 
A. Without 
municipality-fixed 
effects 
 
      
Fee-for-service GP -0.0075
***
 0.0097
***
 -0.0011 -0.0001 -0.1826 0.0045
***
 
 (-5.63) (7.65) (-0.92) (-0.07) (-0.32) (4.59) 
       
B. With 
municipality-fixed 
effects 
 
      
Fee-for-service GP -0.0025 0.0045
***
 -0.0014 0.0014 1.2432
* 
0.0005 
 (-1.86) (3.48) (-1.13) (1.14) (2.13) (0.45) 
       
Mean y 0.361 0.374 0.155 0.120 392.671 0.140 
Fixed effects:       
GP Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnosis Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GPs 11,693 11,693 11,693 11,455 11,693 11,693 
Observations 2,410,043 2,410,043 2,410,043 1,510,752 2,410,043 2,410,043 
t statistics in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. 
1
Patient sample restricted to patients who, in the main sample, are observed merely in consultations with fee-for-
service GPs or with fixed-salary GPs. 
  
Table 6. Robustness check: Effects of remunerations schemes on GP behaviour, sample 
restricted to GPs who have worked as locums more than once in the same municipality. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Fee per 
consultation 
Recall within  
14 days 
Admitted to 
hospital (planned) 
Consultations 
per day 
Fee-for-service 15.1836
***
 0.0107
***
 -0.0002 2.3338
*** 
 (14.46) (3.86) (-0.11) (36.82) 
     
Mean y 285.333 0.177 0.052 11.968 
Fixed effects:     
Municipality Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GP Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnosis Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GPs 1,777 1,777 1,777 3,565 
Observations 2,723,074 2,723,074 2,723,074 432,513 
t statistics in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
 
 
Table 7. Robustness check: Effects of remunerations schemes on service provision, sample 
restricted to GPs who have worked as locums more than once in the same municipality. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Prolonged 
consultation 
Lab test Procedure Sickness 
certificate 
Fee-for-service 0.0258
***
 0.0268
***
 0.0468
***
 0.0298
***
 
 (10.12) (10.75) (19.93) (10.69) 
     
Mean y 0.351 0.415 0.190 0.276 
Fixed effects:     
Municipality Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GP Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnosis Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GPs 1,777 1,777 1,777 1,777 
Observations 2,723,074 2,723,074 2,723,074 2,723,074 
t statistics in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
  
Table 8. Robustness check: Effects of remunerations schemes on health outcomes, sample 
restricted to GPs who have worked as locums more than once in the same municipality. 
 Primary care emergency centres Somatic hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Emergency 
admission within 
7 days 
Emergency 
admission within 
14 days 
Emergency 
admission within 
7 days 
Emergency 
admission within 
14 days 
Fee-for-service -0.0017
* 
-0.0022
*
 -0.0037
*** 
-0.0045
*** 
 (-2.29) (-2.41) (-4.13) (-4.05) 
     
Mean y 0.010 0.016 0.015 0.024 
Fixed effects:     
Municipality Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GP Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnosis Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GPs 1,777 1,777 1,777 1,777 
Observations 2,723,074 2,723,074 2,723,074 2,723,074 
     
t statistics in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
  
Table 9. Effects of remuneration schemes on GP behaviour while a locum, by degree of GP’s 
profit orientation
1
. Sample restricted to consultations with locums who later become regular 
GPs. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total fee per 
consultation 
Recall within 
14 days 
Referral to  
hospital 
Number of 
consultations per 
day 
A. More profit-oriented GPs    
Fee-for-service 18.6515
*** 
0.0135
**
 -0.0147
*** 
3.2731
*** 
 (13.86) (3.86) (-7.22) (26.47) 
     
     
Mean y 280,368 0.174 0.052 12.9752 
GPs 852 852 852 852 
Observations 1,499,807 1,499,807 1,499,807 115,590 
     
B. Less profit-oriented GPs    
Fee-for-service 2.9378 0.0239
***
 -0.0102
*** 
2.4128
*** 
 (1.85) (5.37) (-3.58) (18.29) 
     
     
Mean y 264.328 0.157 0.060 8.698 
GPs 180 180 180 180 
Observations 129,595 129,595 129,595 14,902 
     
Fixed effects:     
GP Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnosis Yes Yes Yes - 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes 
t statistics in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
1 
Panel A and B are estimated for two different subsamples of locums; those who later establish their own patient 
list with fee-for-service payment (Panel A) and with fixed salary (Panel B), respectively. 
 
  
Table 10. Effects of remuneration schemes on GP service provision, by degree of GP’s profit-
orientation. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Prolonged 
consultation 
Lab test Procedure 
 
Sickness 
certificate 
A. More profit-oriented GPs    
Fee-for-service 0.0425
***
 0.0415
***
 0.0421
***
 0.0289
***
 
 (10.27) (10.15) (10.63) (6.28) 
     
     
Mean y 0.336 0.424 0.209 0.288 
GPs 852 852 852 852 
Observations 1,499,807 1,499,807 1,499,807 1,002,374 
     
B. Less profit-oriented GPs    
Fee-for-service -0.0102 0.0056
 
0.0211
***
 0.0413
***
 
 (-1.95) (1.05) (4.61) (6.99) 
     
     
Mean y 0.326 0.382 0.146 0.244 
GPs 180 180 180 180 
Observations 129,595 129,595 129,595 85,711 
     
Fixed effects:     
GP Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnosis Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes 
t statistics in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
  
Figures 
 
 
Figure A1. Distribution of all GP temporary positions according to number of weeks. 
 
 
Figure A2. Distribution of GP temporary positions with fee-for-service contracts according to 
number of weeks. 
 Figure A3. Distribution of GP temporary positions with fixed-salary contracts according to 
number of weeks. 
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